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INTRODUCTION 
American consumer transactions increasingly occur via credit or 
debit card rather than in cash. Every day, credit card transactions 
generate countless receipts. Some consumers take care to shred or 
 
 *  © 2016 J. Patrick Redmon. 
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dispose of their receipts to avoid credit card fraud and identity theft.1 
Some may even notice that those receipts include only a few digits of 
the credit card number and no expiration date. Why then have we 
been told to shred our credit card receipts, when they appear to lack 
significant credit card information?2 Today, the truncation of credit 
card numbers and the removal of expiration dates from credit card 
receipts are near ubiquitous.3 This ubiquity is a product of federal law 
and extensive class action litigation—litigation that continues today.4 
In recent years, well-known companies such as Southwest Airlines,5 
FedEx,6 J. Crew,7 Sunoco,8 and RadioShack9 have all defended 
against class action litigation for failure to truncate credit card 
numbers or remove expiration dates. 
 
 1. That consumers ought to shred credit card receipts remains common advice. See, 
e.g., Veronica Dudley, Tips for Safe, Secure Holiday Shopping, FORT LEAVENWORTH LAMP 
(Nov. 26, 2014, 10:31 AM), http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/article/20141126/NEWS
/141129486/0/SEARCH?template=printart [perma.cc/WC55-8NND]; Mort Mazor, Residents 
Learn How to Deal with Identity Theft, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.) (May 2, 2014), 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-05-02/news/fl-cn-identity-0504-20140502_1_identity-
theft-credit-report-pre-approved-credit-applications [https://perma.cc/T6FG-JJ2Z]. 
 2. Unsigned credit card receipts with only the last four numbers of the card need not 
be shredded, though signed receipts still ought to be shredded as the signature could be 
used by fraudsters. See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, Financial Tuneup: What You Need to 
Shred, N.Y. TIMES: BUCKS BLOG (Mar. 30, 2010, 10:48 AM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes
.com/2010/03/30/financial-tuneup-what-you-need-to-shred/?_r=0	[https://perma.cc/5UBC-
AHRL]. 
 3. See, e.g., Melody Warnick, 9 Things You Should Know About Your Credit Card 
Receipt, CREDITCARDS.COM (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news
/9-things-to-know-about-credit_card-receipts-1273.php [https://perma.cc/294Q-6VHD]. 
 4. See infra Sections I.A–I.C. 
 5. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Southwest Exposed Credit Card Info on Receipts, Suit Says, 
LAW360 (Nov. 28, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/397228/southwest-
exposed-credit-card-info-on-receipts-suit-says?article_related_content=1	[https://perma.cc
/5DCR-5KLG] (failure to remove expiration dates). 
 6. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, FedEx Settles Customers’ FACTA Suit with $50 Gift 
Cards, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/388800/fedex-
settles-customers-facta-suit-with-50-gift-cards?article_related_content=1	[https://perma.cc
/5BL9-FGR4] (printed six digits of credit card numbers). 
 7. Lisa Ryan, J. Crew Sued for Showing Credit Card Digits on Receipts, LAW360 
(Jan. 13, 2015, 5:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/610999/j-crew-sued-for-showing-
credit-card-digits-on-receipts [https://perma.cc/NAM3-4WAB] (printed nine of sixteen 
digits of the credit card number). 
 8. Christine Caulfield, Sunoco Exposes Consumers to Identity Theft: Suit, LAW360 
(Apr. 13, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/22613/sunoco-exposes-consumers
-to-identity-theft-suit?article_related_content=1	[https://perma.cc/7KGF-VEV2] (failure to 
remove expiration dates). 
 9. Jonathan Randles, 7th Circuit Cancels $10 RadioShack Coupon Settlement, LAW360 
(Sept. 19, 2014, 6:41 PM),	http://www.law360.com/articles/579365/7th-circ-cancels-10-
radioshack-coupon-settlement	[https://perma.cc/43TG-9D7M] (failed to remove expiration 
dates). 
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Congress passed the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
of 200310 (“FACTA”) to systematically address issues of identity 
theft.11 By requiring the truncation of credit card numbers and the 
removal of expiration dates from most credit card receipts,12 FACTA 
aimed to deprive identity thieves and fraudsters of a common source 
of credit card information.13 Since FACTA went into effect, the lure 
of attorneys’ fees and aggregated statutory damages (in class action 
suits) has generated much litigation and hundreds of written 
decisions, typically at the district court level.14 Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s seminal decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,15 defendants rarely 
succeeded in obtaining dismissal of such cases on 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.16 Since Iqbal, however, district courts have shown an 
increasing willingness to question the adequacy of complaints, 
particularly with regard to the willful violation of FACTA that 
plaintiffs must allege to recover statutory damages under the law.17 If 
a court does not find a plaintiff’s allegations of willfulness plausible, 
the plaintiff can only recover actual damages.18 Because consumers 
rarely, if ever, suffer significant actual damages from the printing of 
noncompliant receipts, inadequately pleading a willful violation will 
almost always result in dismissal of the claim.19 
 
 10. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 
1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§	1681–1681x (2012)). 
 11. See infra Section I.A. 
 12. For purposes of this Comment, “truncation requirement” refers only to the 
requirement that no more than the last five numbers of a credit card number be printed. 
See 15 U.S.C. §	1681c(g) (2012). 
 13. Id.; see also Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241 §	2(a)(1), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008) (“The Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act	.	.	.	was enacted into law in 2003 and [one] of the purposes of such Act is 
to prevent criminals from obtaining access to consumers’ private financial and credit 
information in order to reduce identity theft and credit card fraud.”). 
 14. As of January 24, 2016, a Westlaw search for the relevant section of the United 
States Code “15 USC 1681c(g)” returns 235 written decisions. As Congress has 
recognized, hundreds more lawsuits have been filed. See infra Section I.B. “Aggregated 
statutory damages” means the available statutory damages multiplied by the number of 
members of a class. FACTA provides for statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 
per violation, §	1681n(a)(1)(A), in addition to the possibility of punitive damages, 
§	1681n(a)(2). In class action FACTA receipt requirement litigation, classes can easily 
exceed 10,000; 100,000; or even 1 million members, resulting in potentially massive 
damages awards, sometimes even exceeding $1 billion. See infra notes 55–59 and 
accompanying text. 
 15. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 16. See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Section III.A. 
 18. See 15 U.S.C. §	1681o (2012) (“Civil liability for negligent noncompliance”). 
 19. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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Despite FACTA’s success in incentivizing retailers to remove 
credit card information from customer receipts, a serious question 
remains as to whether the costs of FACTA receipt litigation and the 
concomitant liability or settlements—costs which are passed on to 
consumers—outweigh the benefits to consumers in preventing 
identity theft.20 This question becomes particularly acute if one 
considers the requirement to remove expiration dates in isolation 
from the truncation requirement. While the benefits of the latter are 
clear, the expiration date requirement provides no additional 
consumer benefit while creating significant compliance costs for 
retailers—costs ultimately borne by consumers.21 Given that the 
expiration date requirement fails any cost-benefit analysis,22 the 
willingness of courts to apply greater scrutiny to FACTA cases is a 
welcome development, at least where only the expiration date 
requirement has been violated.23 
It is worth noting from the outset that this Comment does not 
deal with the entire universe of FACTA credit card receipt 
requirement (§	1681c(g))24 cases. It is primarily concerned with those 
cases in which the plaintiff alleges that the merchant printed only the 
credit card’s expiration date—not cases in which the credit card 
number alone or both the number and the expiration date were 
printed. This is largely because courts rarely dismiss a complaint on a 
motion to dismiss in which the plaintiff has alleged failure to properly 
 
 20. See infra Sections I.B–C. 
 21. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 23. At least it ought to be a welcome development to both retailers and consumers to 
whom the costs of compliance and litigation are passed. The only group that stands to lose 
from tightening pleading standards in these cases is the plaintiffs’ bar. Plaintiffs themselves 
see little direct benefit from FACTA litigation. The settlement scuttled by Judge Richard 
Posner in the RadioShack case is a good example of a typical FACTA settlement. There, 
class counsel would have received about $1 million from the settlement while the named 
plaintiff would have received $5,000, and class members would have received $10 
RadioShack coupons. See Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 628–29 (7th Cir. 
2014); see also Keith v. Back Yard Burgers of Neb., Inc., No. 8:11-CV-00135, 2014 WL 
4781914, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 23, 2014) (settling for approximately $1.1 million for class 
counsel and coupons for plaintiffs); Lori Pilger, Back Yard Burgers Agrees to Settle 
Lawsuit, LINCOLN J. STAR (Sept. 19, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://journalstar.com/business/local
/back-yard-burgers-agrees-to-settle-lawsuit/article_c2c4f596-8aca-5d35-be76-daf5f5e4c1b9
.html [https://perma.cc/7ZWZ-QN6J] (“The restaurant also agreed to give out coupons for 
a free soft drink with the purchase of an entrée to anyone who submits a valid claim.”). 
 24. Section 1681c(g) of Title 15 of the U.S. Code provides the FACTA provision 
requiring truncation of credit card numbers and removal of expiration dates from credit 
card receipts. “Section 1681c(g) cases” will be used as shorthand for FACTA credit card 
receipt requirement litigation. 
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truncate the credit card number.25 Courts treat these facts differently 
because of the more obvious risk of credit card fraud presented by 
credit card numbers on receipts and the greater publicity surrounding 
FACTA’s truncation requirement.26 Further, different inferences 
might arise where a defendant truncated the credit card number and 
yet printed the expiration date—e.g., that the defendant was aware of 
at least some of FACTA’s requirements, attempted to comply, and 
thus violated the law negligently rather than recklessly or willfully. 
Additionally, this Comment concerns itself exclusively with 
attempts to dismiss §	1681c(g) cases on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. It 
does so for two reasons. First, the trend in case law that this Comment 
discusses only emerged following the Supreme Court’s creation of the 
“Twiqbal”27 pleading standards, whose effect is limited to the 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss. Second, the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss provides 
the best opportunity to limit the costs of §	1681c(g) litigation. While 
defendants are often successful in obtaining either summary judgment 
or denial of class certification in §	1681c(g) claims, both of those 
procedures occur later in litigation and presume a defendant willing 
to bear the costs of discovery. The costs of discovery result in a higher 
settlement value for any lawsuit that has overcome the hurdle of a 
motion to dismiss,28 so a successful motion to dismiss better limits 
 
 25. The only exception is Katz v. Donna Karan International, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 
740(PAC), 2015 WL 405506 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015). 
 26. See 154 CONG. REC. 8881 (2008) (statement of Rep. Mahoney) (“[T]he publicity 
surrounding the passage of [FACTA], whether it was press accounts of the President’s 
statement at the signing [or] the subsequent Federal Trade Commission press release 
describing the new requirements of the bill, pointed entirely to the truncation of the credit 
card number.”). 
 27. “Twiqbal” is a portmanteau of “Twombly,” from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007)—the Court’s first heightened pleading standards case—and “Iqbal” 
from Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The term “Twiqbal” appears to have first been 
used in a published court opinion by Judge Kim R. Gibson of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 
754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“That was the standard. No longer. There is a 
‘new sheriff in town’ now policing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and his name is ‘Twiqbal.’	”). But 
the term appears to have been coined somewhat earlier. As far as this author can 
determine, “Twiqbal” first appears in a law review in the published transcript from a 
symposium held by the Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, published almost one year 
earlier than RHJ Medical Center. See Transcript, Emerging Civil Justice Issues, 5th Annual 
Judicial Symposium on Civil Justice Issues: George Mason Judicial Education Program: 
December 5-7, 2010, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 195, 200 (2010). 
 28. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 
1731 (2012) (“Asymmetrical cost imposition is usually most pronounced during the 
discovery process. In general, access to discovery is granted without limitation once a 
motion to dismiss is denied, enabling claimants to impose significant, asymmetric 
production costs on the opposing party.	.	.	.	Accordingly, a claimant will obtain a ‘motion 
to dismiss premium’ in proportion to any temporal or absolute asymmetrical cost 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2016) 
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litigation costs than a motion for summary judgment or for the denial 
of class certification. 
In that context, this Comment makes two fundamental claims. 
First, as an empirical matter, courts more frequently grant motions to 
dismiss in post-Iqbal §	1681c(g) cases. Second, §	1681c(g) litigation 
based only on an expiration date offers no consumer benefit and 
should be limited by the courts. Absent a legislative intervention, the 
trend of applying greater scrutiny to complaints on 12(b)(6) motions 
to dismiss presents the clearest means to mitigate the costs of 
§	1681c(g) litigation and is faithful to the reasoning behind Iqbal and 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.29 Such scrutiny is supported by 
interpreting Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr30—the Supreme 
Court’s decision on “willfulness” in the context of FACTA—as 
creating an affirmative defense to liability rather than supplanting the 
analysis of a defendant’s subjective state of mind—which is usually 
required to establish the element of willfulness.  
Under Safeco, the willfulness requirement is not met if the 
defendant can show reliance on a reasonable construction of an 
ambiguous statute.31 If Safeco creates an affirmative defense, even if a 
defendant cannot establish the elements of that defense (such as 
where the statutory text is too clear to be considered ambiguous), the 
plaintiff still carries a burden. The plaintiff must still make out a 
 
imposition in the discovery stage.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636–38 (1989) (“Litigants with weak cases have little use for bringing 
the facts to light and every reason to heap costs on the adverse party—on this supposition, 
the one in the right. The prospect of these higher costs leads the other side to settle on 
favorable terms. All of the models of settlement imply that parties divide between them 
the gains from avoiding litigation. More discovery (better: the credible threat of more 
discovery) increases these ‘savings,’ which the parties share in a ratio determined by their 
endurance, capacity to bluff, and so on—in other words, by factors unrelated to their legal 
entitlements. The party in a position to threaten exhaustive discovery can claim for itself 
in settlement a portion of the costs that should not have been imposed in the first place.”); 
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 101–02 
(1971) (“If the payment of X by the defendant yields him a higher utility than his expected 
utility from a trial, a settlement will take place. This follows because one can find a 
payment somewhat greater than X that gives both parties a higher utility from a 
settlement than their expected utilities from a trial. It can further be shown that a 
settlement is likely when the following factors are present: (1) both parties have similar 
expectations on the probability that the defendant will be found liable in a trial; (2) both 
parties have similar estimates of the settlement, given that the defendant is found liable in 
a trial; (3) neither party has strong preferences for risk; (4) the costs of a trial including 
lawyer’s fees, time costs of the plaintiff and defendant, court fees, etc. exceed the costs of a 
settlement.”). 
 29. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 30. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007). 
 31. See id. at 69. 
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prima facie case by plausibly pleading that the defendant willfully, 
rather than negligently, violated FACTA. Without such a showing of 
willfulness, statutory damages are out of the question. If, on the other 
hand, Safeco elucidates the meaning of “willfulness” for FACTA 
litigation, then the willfulness element necessary for statutory 
damages has been met if the statutory language is clear. This 
Comment argues that the former interpretation is most faithful to the 
reasoning of Safeco and the Supreme Court’s broader jurisprudence 
on willfulness in the civil context.32 
In order to place these claims in their proper context, Part I 
addresses FACTA’s requirements, the Safeco decision’s standard of 
willfulness, the costs and dubious benefits of class action FACTA 
litigation, and the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on pleading 
standards. Part II provides an overview of pre-Iqbal FACTA case 
law. Part III analyzes post-Iqbal case law and establishes the 
increasing frequency with which courts grant motions to dismiss. Part 
IV shows that competing interpretations of Safeco underlie much of 
the FACTA case law. It goes on to argue that Safeco should be 
understood as supplementing rather than supplanting the traditional 
subjective analysis of a defendant’s state of mind in showing 
willfulness. The Comment concludes by briefly considering potential 
legislative remedies to the costly litigation caused by FACTA’s 
expiration date removal requirement. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Before addressing the specific claims of this Comment, it is 
necessary to examine the statutory background of FACTA litigation, 
the realities of class action §	1681c(g) litigation, the case law 
establishing what constitutes “willfulness,” and the standards for a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Sections I.A and I.B will examine 
FACTA and its underlying policies, as well as the reasons for the 
temporary safe harbor Congress later created for violations of the 
expiration date requirement. Next, Section I.C will explore the 
realities of §	1681c(g) litigation, particularly the massive liability that 
defendants face from the aggregation of statutory damages via class 
action suits. Third, because the recovery of statutory damages 
depends on showing that a defendant willfully violated FACTA, 
Section I.D will explore Safeco, the Supreme Court decision 
establishing the meaning of willfulness in FACTA cases. Finally, 
Section I.E will examine the “new” pleading standards established in 
 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
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Twombly and Iqbal in order to better inform the later discussion of 
pre- and post-Iqbal §	1681c(g) case law. 
A. The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
Congress passed FACTA on December 4, 2003, amending the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”).33 FACTA was intended to 
address identity theft by, among other provisions, requiring lenders to 
identify and respond to possible indications of identity theft, giving 
consumers greater control over their credit history and information, 
and establishing the rights of identity theft victims.34 For example, 
FACTA’s “red flag guidelines” require that financial institutions not 
issue a replacement credit card shortly after a change of address on an 
account—a common ploy used by credit card fraudsters—without 
first sending a notification to the former address, contacting the 
cardholder, or otherwise verifying the change of address.35 FACTA 
also requires merchants to truncate credit card numbers and to 
remove expiration dates from certain receipts given to consumers: 
[N]o person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the 
transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of 
the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt 
provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or 
transaction.	.	.	.	This subsection shall apply only to receipts that 
are electronically printed, and shall not apply to transactions in 
which the sole means of recording a credit card or debit card 
account number is by handwriting or by an imprint or copy of 
the card.36 
Before FACTA went into effect, consumer receipts had proven to be 
a gold mine for enterprising criminals who could easily retrieve 
discarded receipts.37 By eliminating this source of credit card 
information, Congress hoped to reduce credit card fraud.38 
 
 33. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§	1681–1681x (2012)). 
 34. See 15 U.S.C. §§	1681–1681x (2012). 
 35. Id. §	1681m(e)(1)(C). 
 36. Id. §	1681c(g)(1)–(2). 
 37. See Protecting Against Credit Card Fraud, FTC: CONSUMER INFO. (July 2012), 
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0216-protecting-against-credit-card-fraud 
[https://perma.cc/5MX5-69WE]. 
 38. See 149 CONG. REC. H12198-01 (2003) (comments of Rep. Maloney). But see 
Edward A. Morse & Vasant Raval, Private Ordering in Light of the Law: Achieving 
Consumer Protection Through Payment Card Security Measures, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COM. L.J. 213, 224–25, 254 (2012) (noting that merchants, rather than consumers, directly 
bear the costs of fraudulent transactions). 
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However, Congress did not intend FACTA to cover all credit 
card receipts.39 The statute both limits its coverage to “electronically 
printed” receipts and expressly exempts handwritten receipts and 
receipts produced by carbon imprint.40 This exemption appears to be 
based on a judgment that the decreasing frequency of the use of such 
techniques did not justify imposing the costs of new point-of-sale 
systems on merchants who depended on these older methods.41 
Further, the “electronically printed” language has been widely 
interpreted to exclude receipts for online transactions as not being 
printed “at the point of the sale.”42 Congress also provided a three-
year phase-in period from the date of enactment before FACTA’s 
requirements would go into full effect for point-of-sale devices in use 
before 2005.43 This phase-in period provided merchants with an 
opportunity to bring older point-of-sale systems into compliance with 
FACTA’s requirements.44 At the time the law went into effect, many 
merchants were not yet in full compliance, particularly as to the 
requirement to remove credit card expiration dates from receipts.45 
FACTA provides for the recovery of damages based on either 
negligent or willful violations of the law’s requirements.46 For 
negligent violations, a plaintiff may recover only actual damages,47 
whereas, unless actual damages are greater, willful violations can 
result in statutory damages from $100 to $1,000,48 in addition to any 
punitive damages awarded.49 In either case, a successful plaintiff may 
 
 39. See §	1681c(g)(2) (“This subsection shall apply only to receipts that are 
electronically printed, and shall not apply to transactions in which the sole means of 
recording a credit card or debit card account number is by handwriting or by an imprint or 
copy of the card.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 254 (“[T]his restrictive approach toward 
reducing security risks may be justified when the expected consumer harm (and merchant 
losses) from reduced access to payment options may outweigh the limited marginal risk 
from the low-volume and high-cost form of identity theft based on carbon forms.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Shlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794, 798, 802 (7th Cir. 
2010) (citing district courts reaching the same conclusion), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1007 
(2011). 
 43. §	1681c(g)(3) (requiring that devices brought online beginning January 1, 2005, be 
FACTA compliant). 
 44. See id. 
 45. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565 (2008); see also infra note 54. 
 46. §§	1681n, 1681o. According to Safeco, a willful violation is either a reckless or 
knowing violation of FACTA’s requirements. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 47. Id. §	1681o(a)(1). 
 48. Id. §	1681n(a)(1)(A). 
 49. Id. §	1681n(a)(2). 
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obtain costs and attorney’s fees from the defendant.50 Additionally, 
FACTA imposes no cap on total damages, whether as to an 
individual plaintiff or in the aggregate.51 Accordingly, §	1681c(g) 
violators are an attractive target for enterprising class action counsel 
because of the possibility of obtaining attorney’s fees and the 
repeating nature of FACTA violations, viz., that a noncompliant 
point-of-sale system will continually print noncompliant receipts, each 
potentially enlarging the class of plaintiffs.52 Many businesses 
discovered this after §	1681c(g)’s requirements became effective and 
§	1681c(g) lawsuits flooded federal courts. 
B. The Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 
In response to the rash of lawsuits that followed the truncation 
requirement’s effective date, Congress passed the Credit and Debit 
Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 (the “Clarification Act”).53 
While retailers and point-of-sale providers had largely understood 
that FACTA requires credit card numbers to be truncated on 
electronic receipts generated at the point of sale, many failed to 
understand that FACTA also requires the removal of expiration 
dates.54 This misunderstanding appears to have stemmed from the fact 
that even the government’s own publicity regarding the new 
requirements focused entirely on the credit card number truncation 
requirement.55 As a result of retail merchants’ failure to understand 
FACTA’s requirements, many noncompliant receipts were printed, 
and plaintiffs brought hundreds of lawsuits alleging willful violations 
of FACTA by the printing of credit card receipts with expiration 
dates.56 Congress recognized the lack of consumer benefit from such 
 
 50. Id. §§	1681n(a)(3), 1681o(a)(2). 
 51. See id. §§	1681n, 1681o. 
 52. What is printed on a receipt is determined by how a point of sale device is 
configured. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey J. Hawkins, Exec. Dir., Glob. Software Dev., 
Toshiba Global Commerce Solutions, Inc. (Feb. 3, 2015). A device programmed to print 
all the digits of a credit number or to print a card’s expiration date will continually print 
until it is reconfigured to do otherwise. The size of the class will be especially large if a 
faulty configuration is used across an entire retail chain as opposed to just at one 
location—every device in every location will generate noncompliant receipts for all 
consumer transactions that take place so long as the devices are improperly configured. 
 53. Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565 (2008).  
 54. See 154 CONG. REC. 8881 (2008) (statement of Rep. Mahoney) (“The 
overwhelming majority of businesses believed that they were in compliance with this 
provision of the law by truncating the card number and printing the expiration date of the 
credit card.”). 
 55. See id. 
 56. Clarification Act §	2(a)(4).  
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lawsuits and passed the Clarification Act to create a temporary safe 
harbor against lawsuits alleging willful violations of the expiration 
date requirement for the period from FACTA’s enactment in 
December 2004 to the enactment of the Clarification Act on June 3, 
2008.57 
In addition to the safe harbor provision it enacted, Congress 
made a number of findings of fact: 
 That merchants had widely understood the statute to require 
truncation of the credit card number or removal of the 
expiration date, rather than requiring both; 
 That hundreds of lawsuits were filed on the basis of an 
expiration date alone, none of which contained allegations of 
harm to any consumer’s identity; 
 That experts agreed that truncation of the card number 
rendered removal of the expiration date superfluous, such that 
removal of the expiration date does not provide any benefit to 
consumers in preventing identity theft or credit card fraud; 
and 
 That the widespread litigation represented a “significant 
burden” on merchants, the costs of which would likely be 
passed on to consumers, creating a true harm to consumers.58 
These findings establish that the expiration date requirement fails to 
provide additional consumer protection while simultaneously creating 
significant litigation costs for merchants.59 
Further, in the Clarification Act’s purpose clause, Congress 
labeled lawsuits based only on a printed expiration date without an 
accompanying allegation of actual harm as “abusive,” given the lack 
of additional consumer protection generated by requiring removal of 
expiration dates and the likely harm to consumers via higher prices 
resulting from the additional removal requirement and resulting 
litigation.60 As evinced by the limited temporal nature of the safe-
harbor provision, however, Congress did not amend the statute to 
require actual damages for a suit based only on the presence of the 
expiration date or otherwise put an end to such lawsuits.61 Merchants 
are thus left in the strange position of having to ensure compliance 
 
 57. 15 U.S.C. §	1681n(d) (2012). 
 58. Clarification Act §	2(a). 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. §	2(b). 
 61. See id. §	3(a). 
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with a requirement that offers little to no consumer benefit or else 
face potentially massive liability for noncompliance via class action 
litigation. 
C. Class Action FACTA Litigation 
All, or nearly all, §	1681c(g) suits allege willful violations and 
seek to obtain statutory rather than actual damages.62 Statutory 
damages, combined with the repeating nature of FACTA violations—
point-of-sale systems are programmed to always print certain 
information on receipts and if incorrectly programmed will print 
noncompliant receipts for all transactions—create an attractive fact 
pattern for class action plaintiffs’ attorneys.63 Sometimes the same 
plaintiffs and attorneys may file multiple lawsuits against different 
defendants, and the plaintiff may be an employee or relative of an 
employee of the law firm.64 This behavior suggests that FACTA 
powerfully incentivizes plaintiffs’ attorneys to seek out §	1681c(g) 
violations, essentially acting as “bounty hunters.”65 Such conduct is 
unsurprising given the potentially massive liability and the 
correspondingly higher settlement value of even weak §	1681c(g) 
cases. For example, in one case, the potential class included 2.9 
million consumers, bringing potential statutory damages to between 
$290 million and $2.9 billion—a powerful incentive for 
 
 62. See id. §	2(a)(4). In the course of his own research, this author has never found a 
case alleging actual damages, except where plaintiffs’ claims for willful violation were 
foreclosed by the Clarification Act. See, e.g., Aliano v. Amerigas Partners, L.P., No. 07 C 
4110, 2009 WL 635547, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009) (citing similar cases). To speculate, 
the lack of cases alleging actual damage may result from the fact that merchants, rather 
than consumers, bear the costs of fraudulent transactions and, additionally, that the 
information on a credit card receipt is probably insufficient for the purposes of identity 
thieves. See Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 224–25. 
 63. See Clarification Act §	2(a)(4) (noting that “hundreds of lawsuits were filed” 
alleging willful violation of FACTA “almost immediately after the deadline for 
compliance passed”). 
 64. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Lifetime Brands, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 753, 753 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (Jennifer Ehrheart, represented by Gary F. Lynch et al.); Ehrheart v. Verizon 
Wireless, 547 F. Supp. 2d 463, 463 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (Nicole Ehrheart, represented by Gary 
F. Lynch et al.); Ehrheart v. Bose Corp., No. 07-350, 2008 WL 64491, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 
10, 2007) (Nicole Ehrheart represented by Gary F. Lynch et al.). According to LinkedIn, a 
Jennifer Ehrheart is a staff accountant at Carlson Lynch Ltd., a law firm of which Gary F. 
Lynch is a founding partner. Jennifer Ehrheart, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/pub
/jennifer-ehrheart/42/589/93b (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6FK3-MXZT 
(dark archive)]; Gary F. Lynch, CARLSON LYNCH, http://carlsonlynch.com/profiles
/GaryLynch (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7UNT-A5B8]. 
 65. Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 256. 
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entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys to file suit and for risk-averse 
corporations to settle.66 
These lawsuits resemble a kind of strike suit—i.e., “suits brought 
to force settlement, regardless of merit, merely because the risk of 
loss is too great.”67 Usually, “strike suit” denotes a shareholder 
derivative action.68 But, whereas a shareholder derivative suit is not 
necessarily abusive,69 Congress itself has recognized that there is no 
consumer benefit from suits based on the inclusion of expiration dates 
on credit card receipts.70 Indeed, even suits based on the credit card 
number truncation requirement may offer dubious benefits.71 For 
example, consider the case of a movie theatre company that printed 
290,000 receipts containing the first four and last four digits of the 
credit cards used.72 Despite failing to comply with the law’s 
requirement to include no more than the last five digits, in this case 
there would still be 100 million possible combinations for the 
remaining eight digits, leaving aside the additional combinations 
when accounting for the possible expiration dates.73 Further, no actual 
damages were ever shown, yet the movie theatre company faced 
potential statutory damages of $29 million to $290 million.74 
While such potential awards speak to FACTA’s deterrent effect, 
such a powerful incentive probably results in disproportionate 
investment in compliance with respect to the near-zero risk of harm 
to consumers from expiration dates.75 These costs, along with the 
 
 66. Lopez v. KB Toys Retail, Inc., No. CV 07-144-JFW (CWx), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 82025, at *14 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2007). 
 67. Michael E. Chaplin, What’s So Fair About the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 307, 324–25 (2008). 
 68. Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 69. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 119 (1999) (“The primary method for enforcing management’s 
fiduciary duties is the shareholder derivative action.”). 
 70. See Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-241 §	2(a)(6), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008).  
 71. See Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 254–56. 
 72. Id. at 255 (citing Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 
2010)). It is unclear from FACTA’s legislative history why Congress drew the line at no 
more than five digits. It may be that five was judged to be the maximum number of digits a 
consumer would need to differentiate one card from another without giving away too 
much of the account number. Of course, much of legislative line drawing results in 
problems of over- or under-inclusiveness. 
 73. Id.  
 74. To elaborate: 290,000 printed receipts multiplied by the range of possible 
statutory damages per violation of $100 to $1000 equals $29 million to $290 million. See 15 
U.S.C. §	1681c(g) (2012); Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 255 (citing Bateman v. Am. 
Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 75. Morse & Raval, supra note 38, at 256. 
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costs of litigation and settlements spurred on by the “bounty” of 
windfall statutory damages, are ultimately borne by consumers.76 In 
light of these incentives to settle, defendants are unlikely to pursue 
litigation into discovery. Yet even pre-Iqbal defendants were not 
entirely without defenses against allegations of a willful violation of 
§	1681c(g). 
D. Safeco—“Willfulness” in FACTA Litigation 
Section 1681c(g) defendants have attempted to raise a variety of 
defenses, including attacking plaintiffs’ Article III standing for lack of 
injury in fact, as well as challenging FACTA’s damages provisions as 
violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for being 
unconstitutionally vague or for the statutory damages being unduly 
punitive in proportion to actual damages.77 With one exception, 
federal courts have rejected such constitutional challenges to the 
law.78 Additionally, defendants often successfully challenge class 
certification, though a discussion of these efforts is beyond the scope 
of this Comment, particularly because class certification is usually 
addressed after a 12(b)(6) motion has been rejected.79 
Given the failure of these constitutional challenges, a defendant’s 
best recourse on a motion to dismiss is to argue that the plaintiff has 
not adequately pleaded the willfulness element necessary for the 
recovery of statutory damages. Accordingly, the success of a 12(b)(6) 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham, L.L.C., 552 F. Supp. 2d 
1302, 1305–09 (N.D. Ala. 2008) (dismissing four cases on summary judgment and holding 
FACTA unconstitutionally vague), vacated, Harris v. Mex. Specialty Foods, 564 F.3d 1301 
(11th Cir. 2009); Amason v. Kangaroo Express, No. 7:09-CV-2117-RDP, 2013 WL 985536, 
at *3–4 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 2013) (rejecting a challenge to plaintiff’s Article III standing 
and noting that other district courts have examined the question and reached the same 
result). 
 78. The exception is Grimes. 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–09. For a case rejecting various 
constitutional arguments where the United States intervened to defend the statute, see 
Irvine v. 233 Skydeck, LLC, 597 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802–04 (N.D. Ill. 2009). The Irvine court 
rejected the vagueness challenge, observing that providing a range of available statutory 
damages is commonplace and routinely upheld as understandable to an ordinary person 
operating a business. Id. at 803. In response to the excessively punitive damages argument, 
the court noted that courts routinely reduce excessive awards and, in any case, it was 
premature to make such an as-applied challenge on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 804. 
 79. See, e.g., Ticknor v. Rouse’s Enters., L.L.C., No. 14-30550, 592 Fed. App’x. 276, 
2014 WL 6440397, at *1 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of class certification on 
predominance and superiority grounds); see also Holly S. Hosford, Avoiding Annihilation: 
Why Trial Judges Should Refuse to Certify a FACTA Class Action for Statutory Damages 
Where the Recovery Would Likely Leave the Defendant Facing Imminent Insolvency, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1941, 1942–44 (2012) (arguing for denial of class certification given the potential 
for annihilative aggregate statutory damages). 
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motion to dismiss will depend on how “willfulness” is defined. The 
Supreme Court established in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. 
Burr that, in the context of FACTA litigation, “willfulness” includes 
both knowing violations of the law’s provisions as well as violations 
caused by reckless disregard of §	1681c(g).80 
In Safeco—a consolidation of two similar cases from the Ninth 
Circuit—the defendant insurance companies were sued for violations 
of FACTA provisions unrelated to the credit card requirements, 
specifically for failure to give notice to a consumer that an adverse 
action (offering higher than the best available insurance premiums) 
was taken based on the consumers’ credit reports.81 Following grants 
of summary judgment for the defendants in the district courts, the 
Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded both cases, holding that actions 
taken in reckless disregard of consumers’ rights under FACTA 
constitute willful violations.82 The Supreme Court took up the case to 
resolve a circuit split as to whether “willfulness” reached not only 
knowing and intentional violations of FACTA but also those 
occurring due to reckless disregard.83 
After agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that “willfulness” under 
FACTA includes reckless disregard, the Court went on to define 
“reckless disregard.”84 Making clear that it was not “deviat[ing] from 
the common law understanding” of recklessness, the Court 
unanimously held that 
a company subject to the FCRA does not act in reckless 
disregard	.	.	. unless the action is not only a violation under a 
reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the 
company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater 
than the risk associated with a reading that was merely 
careless.85 
In other words, conduct based on an interpretation of the statute that 
is not “objectively unreasonable” does not rise to the level of reckless 
disregard, even if the interpretation is mistaken.86 
 
 80. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56–60 (2007). 
 81. Id. at 54–56. 
 82. Id. at 55–56. 
 83. Id. at 56 & n.8. 
 84. Id. at 68–70. 
 85. Id. at 69. 
 86. Id. at 70 (“Given this dearth of guidance and the less-than-pellucid statutory text, 
Safeco’s reading was not objectively unreasonable, and so falls well short of raising the 
‘unjustifiably high risk’ of violating the statute necessary for reckless liability.”). 
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Given the relative clarity of §	1681c(g), Safeco has been of 
limited utility to defendants in that context. Some courts have even 
interpreted it to foreclose dismissal of complaints alleging inclusion of 
an expiration date on credit card receipts because the truncation 
requirements are clear.87 Safeco does occasionally aid defendants 
where there is a novel or unusual fact pattern, such as where the 
defendant printed the month but not the year of a card’s expiration 
date.88 In such cases, courts examine (1) whether the defendant’s 
interpretation has some basis in the text of the statute; (2) whether 
federal courts of appeal or administrative agencies have 
authoritatively interpreted the language in question; and (3) in a court 
of appeal, whether the district court found the defendant’s 
interpretation persuasive.89 
Because defendants have largely been unable to use a Safeco 
defense on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, they have turned to 
attacking the complaint as failing to adequately plead a willful 
violation of FACTA.90 This has become the most common and most 
successful line of argument for disposing of §	1681c(g) suits before 
entering into discovery.91 But this success is a relatively new 
development in the case law—one that only fully took shape 
following the Supreme Court’s new pleading standards jurisprudence 
in the late 2000s.92 
E. Twombly and Iqbal—“New” Pleading Standards 
A full discussion of the latest FACTA case law is incomplete 
without the context of the development of federal pleading standards, 
particularly since the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal decisions. Recent §	1681c(g) cases granting motions to dismiss 
rely in part on more carefully scrutinizing complaints in light of 
 
 87. E.g., Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 761–62 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 88. See Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., 671 F.3d 371, 377 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
printing the month did violate FACTA but that the violation was not willful because it was 
based on a mistaken but not objectively unreasonable interpretation of the statute); see 
also Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 638–40 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) 
(printing the month alone may have violated FACTA but was not willful because it was 
based on “a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute”). 
 89. See Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70; Redman, 768 F.3d at 639–40. See generally S.L. Owens, 
Avoiding the Urkel Defense (Did I Do That?): How Safeco Has (and Has Not) Begun to 
Provide an Affirmative Defense Against Statutory Willfulness, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 51 (2015) 
(describing the use of the Safeco defense in the context of various federal statutes, 
including FACTA). 
 90. See infra Parts II–III. 
 91. Infra Part III. 
 92. Id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2016) 
1330 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
Twombly and Iqbal.93 Cases denying motions to dismiss, on the other 
hand, typically fail to engage in a rigorous “Twiqbal” analysis.94 The 
opposing views playing out in the FACTA case law could be 
considered a mere flash point in a larger debate about the state of 
pleading standards after Twombly and Iqbal and whether those two 
cases are to be construed in continuity with or as a break from pre-
Twiqbal pleading standards.95 
Before the Twiqbal decisions, the pleading standard established 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was known as “notice 
pleading.”96 Unlike the earlier code pleading that required detailed 
factual allegations,97 notice pleading was meant to provide no more 
than notice to the parties and the court—that is, a general idea of the 
claim being made and the basis for the relief requested.98 
Accordingly, Rule 8 requires only “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”99 This loose 
standard received its classical interpretation in Conley v. Gibson.100 
“In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow	.	.	. the 
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim.”101 But Twombly and 
Iqbal dispensed with this language and cast into doubt the validity of 
notice pleading. 
 
 93. See, e.g., Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No. 13 
Civ. 7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014) (holding that 
plaintiff’s allegations of a willful violation of §	1681c(g) were implausible), appeal 
docketed, No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014). 
 94. See infra note 156. 
 95. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 127–30 (2010) (arguing that 
Twombly and Iqbal do represent a significant shift in pleading standards, one that 
threatens public access to federal courts for the redress of wrongs, in sharp contrast to the 
notice pleading approach exemplified by the classic civil procedure case of  
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944)); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading 
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2010) (“The only aspect of prior case law 
that	Twombly	and	Iqbal	set aside was a misunderstood fifty-year-old phrase whose real 
meaning was never called into question.”). 
 96. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
 97. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 459–60 (1943) (noting that 
although adopted to reform the overly detailed and complex common law pleading, code 
pleading had shown the same tendency to ever-greater factual specificity and detail as its 
predecessor). 
 98. Id. at 460. 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 100. Conley, 355 U.S. at 41. 
 101. Id. at 45–46. 
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In Twombly, consumers sued local telephone companies—
“incumbent local exchange carriers” that had once held regional 
monopolies on local phone service but were later required to open 
their networks to competing phone services—alleging patterns of 
parallel conduct produced by collusion not to compete with each 
other in order to restrain the entry of new competition.102 The 
Southern District of New York dismissed the case on a 12(b)(6) 
motion, holding that mere allegation of parallel business conduct was 
insufficient to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.103 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.104 Relying on the classic 
language from Conley, the Second Circuit held that the district court 
had employed too stringent a standard in evaluating the complaint.105 
The Supreme Court reversed.106 
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Court held that a complaint 
must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”107 The 
Court continued, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right 
to relief above the speculative level,” though such allegations must 
still be assumed to be true, however improbable.108 Accordingly, mere 
parallel conduct and a “bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice” 
because such allegations raise only a possibility of entitlement to 
relief—they do not render the claim plausible.109 The Court went on 
to disavow the “no set of facts” language from Conley upon which the 
Second Circuit depended, characterizing it as an “incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard” that described “the 
breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, 
not the minimum standard of adequate pleading.”110 
Beyond the consensus in the legal community that Twombly 
represented some kind of change, questions remained about the 
decision’s breadth.111 Specifically, it was unclear whether a broad shift 
in pleading standards had occurred or whether Twombly was 
 
 102. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549–51 (2007). 
 103. Id. at 552. 
 104. Id. at 553. 
 105. Id. (holding that to dismiss the complaint, it would be necessary “to conclude that 
there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular 
parallelism asserted was the product of collusion rather than coincidence” (quoting 
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005))). 
 106. Id. at 570. 
 107. Id. at 555. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 556–57. 
 110. Id. at 562–63. 
 111. Steinman, supra note 95, at 1305–06. 
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somehow limited to the antitrust context.112 But in 2009, the Supreme 
Court made clear in Iqbal that Twombly concerned the pleading 
standards applicable not just to antitrust cases, but to all cases.113 
In Iqbal, plaintiff Javaid Iqbal sued John Ashcroft, the former 
U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, the former Director of 
the FBI, alleging that, following his arrest in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, Iqbal had been deprived of his constitutional 
rights.114 Specifically, Iqbal alleged that “harsh conditions of 
confinement” were imposed on the basis of his “race, religion, or 
national origin.”115 Before Twombly was decided, the Eastern District 
of New York, relying on the “no set of facts” language from Conley,116 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified 
immunity, after which an interlocutory appeal was filed.117 The 
Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that while Twombly had retired 
the Conley formula, the new standard only applied in certain 
“contexts where [factual] amplification is needed to render the claim 
plausible.”118 But Iqbal’s case did present such a context, and the 
Supreme Court reversed.119 
Reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that Twombly was not limited to the antitrust context but applied to 
all complaints as an interpretation of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.120 Indeed, the Court expressly rejected the argument 
that Twombly was limited to antitrust cases.121 Elaborating on 
Twombly’s language, the Iqbal Court set forth two principles 
governing 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. First, legal conclusions ought 
not be assumed true whereas factual allegations must still be 
presumed true; second, a complaint must state a “plausible claim for 
relief,” something more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.”122 
This second step requires judges to “draw on [their] judicial 
experience and common sense” in performing this “context-specific 
task.”123 
 
 112. Id. at 1305. 
 113. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). 
 114. Id. at 666. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 669. 
 117. Id. at 666. 
 118. Id. at 670 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 119. See id. at 687. 
 120. See id. at 677–78. 
 121. Id. at 684. 
 122. Id. at 678–79. 
 123. Id. at 679. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2016) 
2016] FACTA LITIGATION 1333 
The judicial sifting that Twombly and Iqbal require courts to 
engage in is meant to respond to the increasing costs of discovery and 
the danger of extortionate strike suits.124 In Twombly, a complex 
antitrust case, financial costs were directly implicated: “something 
beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a 
plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the 
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing 
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”125 The Court 
continued, “[T]his basic deficiency should	.	.	.	be exposed at the point 
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the 
court.”126 That point of minimum expenditure is the 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss, before discovery begins.127 Although concerns with the 
financial costs of discovery were not so directly at issue in Iqbal’s civil 
rights claim, an analogous concern was present.128 Civil rights suits 
such as Iqbal’s threaten to distract the attention of government 
officials and divert resources from the concerns of governing.129 
Accordingly, the Twombly and Iqbal standard is concerned with 
freeing defendants from the costs of frivolous discovery and thereby 
reducing the settlement value of otherwise meritless suits. In applying 
that standard, courts should therefore weigh the risks and costs of 
discovery against the social utility to be gained.130 
Whether Twombly and Iqbal establish a new and heightened 
pleading standard or merely refine the method by which courts 
evaluate complaints on a 12(b)(6) motion continues to be debated,131 
 
 124. See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1621, 1630 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly and 
Iqbal “to recalibrate plaintiffs’	discovery	rights” is justified in light of the costs of e-
discovery and reflects a preexisting practice among district courts responding to those 
costs, while also noting that there may be better means to control discovery costs). 
 125. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharms., 
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)) (internal quotation marks removed). 
 126. Id. at 558 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §	1216, at 233–34 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 127. Fitzpatrick, supra note 124, at 1627 (“Summary judgment was too late to weed out 
meritorious claims, the Court said, because	discovery	had become far too costly and 
burdensome to force defendants to endure it without at least some assurance that the 
endeavor had some merit to it.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557–59)). 
 128. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (following Twombly in rejecting the “careful-case-
management” approach to cabining discovery). 
 129. See id. at 685 (“Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with 
the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and 
resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the 
Government.”).  
 130. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 124, at 1627–28. 
 131. See Michael Eaton, The Key to the Courthouse Door: The Effect of Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal and the Heightened Pleading Standard, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 315–25 (2011) 
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but after Iqbal, it is certain that 12(b)(6) motions cannot be disposed 
of without reference to and application of the Rule 8 standard as set 
forth in those cases. As we will see, this is particularly true in the 
context of §	1681c(g) claims, where Iqbal has had a substantial effect 
on the granting of motions to dismiss.132 
Having surveyed the background law necessary to understand 
the FACTA case law, we now turn to a brief examination of the pre-
Iqbal §	1681c(g) litigation. Thereafter our attention will turn to the 
post-Iqbal case law and the competing interpretations of Safeco in 
those cases. 
II.  PRE-IQBAL FACTA RECEIPT REQUIREMENT LITIGATION 
Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, defendants rarely obtained 
dismissal of FACTA receipt complaints on 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss.133 Excluding complaints based on internet receipts, claims 
foreclosed by the Clarification Act, and those where Safeco applies,134 
prior to Iqbal only two district courts had dismissed complaints for 
factual insufficiency of the pleadings—more specifically, failure to 
plausibly allege a willful violation.135 Unsurprisingly, both courts cited 
to and applied Twombly.136 But those were rare exceptions, and their 
 
(contrasting these competing views of the “Twiqbal” standard); see also Jonah B. Gelbach, 
Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on 
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2277–78 (2012) (finding, in an empirical study, 
that the Twiqbal standard has not only had effects on grant rates of 12(b)(6) motions, but 
has also had effects in terms of what suits are brought by plaintiffs). There is a rich 
empirical literature on the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the federal courts. See 
generally, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 
VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015) (surveying the previous literature and offering a new empirical 
study showing that the existing literature tends to underestimate the impact of the new 
pleading standards); David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study 
of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (examining the empirical research that 
has arisen post-Iqbal).  
 132. See infra Part III; see also Appendix B. 
 133. See infra Appendix A. 
 134. These are all cases of legal rather than factual insufficiency. It is worth recalling 
here that this Comment focuses exclusively on cases challenging the plausibility of 
plaintiffs’ allegations of a willful violation.  
 135. Rosenthal v. Longchamp Coral Gables, LLC (Rosenthal I), 603 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 
1361–62 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (granting dismissal with leave to amend); Howard v. Hooters, No. 
H-07-3399, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2008) (Hughes, J.) 
(denying class certification and granting dismissal without leave to amend). 
 136. Rosenthal I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1361 (“The Court will analyze Plaintiff’s allegations 
under Safeco[]	.	.	.	and Twombly.”); Howard, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776, at *3 (citing 
Twombly for the proposition that “mere assertions and a formulaic recitation of the 
statute are insufficient”). 
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persuasive force is limited.137 Nonetheless, they anticipate the line of 
argument that would later become more successful following Iqbal—
that the plaintiff has failed to make adequate factual allegations to 
plausibly claim a willful violation of FACTA.138 
Excluding the outliers mentioned above, most pre-Iqbal 
complaints survived 12(b)(6) motions by providing only generalized 
allegations about the length of time since FACTA’s passage, the 
attendant publicity, the compliance of other businesses, and the 
practice of credit card companies of informing merchants of 
FACTA’s requirements.139 Of the twenty-one written decisions in 
which defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately 
allege a willful violation, twenty resulted in denials of defendants’ 
12(b)(6) motions.140 Even counting only cases decided after Twombly, 
fifteen resulted in denials of motions to dismiss as compared to two 
grants of 12(b)(6) motions.141 Such cases, when they do apply 
Twombly, rarely explain why such generalized facts—facts consistent 
with either a negligent or a willful violation—are sufficient to make 
the claim of liability not merely possible but plausible.142 The implicit 
assumption seems to be that given the publicity attendant to 
FACTA’s passage, the information about FACTA provided by credit 
card companies, and the length of time since FACTA’s passage, any 
 
 137. Not only can the decision in Howard v. Hooters be described as idiosyncratic, but 
it also fails to make clear what allegations were made in the complaint such that they were 
inadequate. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776, at *1–4; see also In re TJX Cos., Fair & 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act Litig., No. 07-md-1853-KHV, 2008 WL 2020375, at *3 
(D. Kan. May 9, 2008) (“[T]he court dismissed plaintiff’s FACTA claim for insufficient 
allegations of willfulness without actually summarizing the complaint.” (citing Howard, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30776)). Rosenthal I depends on an argument that is no longer 
available today. Specifically, the argument seems to be that because the violation in 
question occurred shortly after the expiration of the Clarification Act’s safe-harbor period, 
something more than a bare allegation of a noncompliant receipt (containing the 
expiration date only) was needed to plausibly suggest that defendant’s noncompliance was 
at least reckless rather than negligent. Rosenthal I, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 1361–62. 
 138. See infra Section III.A; see also Appendix B. 
 139. See infra Appendix A; see, e.g., Kubas v. Standard Parking Corp. Ill., 594 F. Supp. 
2d 1029, 1031–32 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (describing plaintiff’s allegations regarding the 
enactment of FACTA and its grace period, the practices of card issuers, and other 
businesses’ compliance). 
 140. See infra Appendix A. 
 141. Id. Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 544 (2007). 
 142. See, e.g., In re TJX Cos., 2008 WL 2020375, at *2; Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. 
Supp. 2d 782, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (asserting that the plaintiff’s allegations of general facts 
applicable to any §	1681c(g) defendant plausibly suggest willfulness but failing to say why 
such facts, consistent with either willfulness or negligence, make willfulness plausible); 
Ehrheart v. Lifetime Brands, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (stating the 
same). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2016) 
1336 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
violation of §	1681c(g) is sufficient to make out a plausible claim for a 
willful violation. 
An example of this tendency can be found in In re TJX Cos., Fair 
& Accurate Credit Transactions Act Litigation,143 where the plaintiff 
alleged the inclusion of an expiration date on a receipt.144 The court, 
on its way to rejecting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, first 
dutifully noted Twombly and the new plausibility standard requiring 
“minimal factual allegations” on each element in order to state a 
plausible claim.145 Next, rather than engaging in an analysis of the 
complaint after disregarding conclusory allegations, the court recited 
the plaintiffs’ allegations that “defendants recognized their statutory 
duty to limit the information which appeared on customer receipts, 
but intentionally ignored that duty and refused to take steps to 
comply with FACTA.”146 But those appear to be conclusory 
allegations lacking underlying facts, just like the allegations of 
conspiracy in Twombly.147 Despite the conclusory nature of these 
allegations, the court concluded that “[w]hen taken as true, [they] 
state a plausible claim for willful violations of FACTA.”148 Thus, the 
court failed to follow Twombly by undertaking the plausibility 
analysis after first disregarding conclusory allegations.149 
In support of its conclusion, the court produced a string cite of 
cases purporting to show both that the plaintiffs’ allegations were 
“typical” and that courts have “uniformly rejected the argument that 
such allegations do not sufficiently allege willful violations of the 
statute.”150 But the four cases cited suffered from the same defect as 
In re TJX itself—they failed to analyze how generalized allegations 
that are consistent with negligent, reckless, or knowing violations 
make a reckless or knowing violation plausible rather than merely 
possible.151 This defect is common in the pre-Iqbal case law, and it is 
 
 143. No. 07-md-1853-KHV, 2008 WL 2020375 (D. Kan. May 9, 2008). 
 144. Id. at *1. 
 145. Id. at *2. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). 
 148. In re TJX, 2008 WL 2020375, at *2. 
 149. This is somewhat understandable given that Twombly did not articulate the two 
required steps as Iqbal would later do. Disregarding conclusory allegations of conspiracy 
was instead what the Twombly Court did before holding that allegations of parallel 
behavior did not nudge a claim under §	1 of the Sherman Act from possible to plausible. 
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57, 564. 
 150. In re TJX, 2008 WL 2020375, at *2. 
 151. See Ramirez v. MGM Mirage, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1233 (D. Nev. 2007); 
Follman v. Hosp. Plus of Carpentersville, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962–63 (N.D. Ill. 2007); 
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only after Iqbal that courts begin to apply greater scrutiny to 
§	1681c(g) claims.152 
III.  POST-IQBAL LITIGATION 
Despite Iqbal’s clarification of pleading standards, its application 
to §	1681c(g) claims has been uneven. Two cases that followed Iqbal 
by a matter of months and denied motions to dismiss failed to even 
cite Iqbal, much less apply it.153 At least one case concluded, without 
any plausibility analysis, that because Safeco did not expressly require 
willfulness to be pleaded, a conclusory allegation of willfulness was 
sufficient.154 Similarly, another case largely avoided the issue by 
asserting that the question of willfulness is more appropriate for 
summary judgment.155 More common, however, are cases that cite 
Iqbal while depending on pre-Iqbal cases that deny motions to 
dismiss §	1681c(g) claims—as though pre-Iqbal case law continues to 
have the same persuasive force in a post-Iqbal world.156 Less 
frequently, as discussed in the next paragraph, a court rigorously 
applies Iqbal yet denies a motion to dismiss.157 
 
Iosello v. Leiblys, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784–85 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Ehrheart v. Lifetime 
Brands, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 152. See infra Section III.A; see also Appendix B. 
 153. Steinberg v. Stitch & Craft, Inc., No. 09-60660-CIV, 2009 WL 2589142, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 18, 2009); Rosenthal v. Longchamp Coral Gables, LLC (Rosenthal II), No. 08–
21757–CIV, 2009 WL 1854846, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2009). It is worth noting that 
although this latter motion to dismiss had been briefed prior to Iqbal, defense counsel 
filed a notice of supplemental authority on Iqbal two days after that case was decided, and 
over a month before the court decided Rosenthal II. See Defendant’s Notice of 
Supplemental Authority In Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended 
Complaint at 1–4, Rosenthal v. Longchamp Coral Gables, LLC (S.D. Fla. 2009) (No. 08-
21757-CIV-MORENO/TORRES), 2009 WL 1854846. 
 154. Desousa v. Anupam Enters., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-504-FtM-29DNF, 2010 WL 
2026114, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2010) (“[Safeco] did not, however, provide that reckless 
disregard was an additional allegation that must be pled.”). 
 155. Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 761 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 156. See, e.g., Lavery v. RadioShack Corp., No. 13-CV-05818, 2014 WL 2819037, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. June 23, 2014) (“In	this	District, such allegations have repeatedly been held 
sufficient to survive the pleading stage.” (citing	Kubas v. Standard Parking Corp. Ill., 594 
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031–32 (N.D. Ill. 2009))); Troy v. Home Run Inn, Inc., No. 07 C 4331, 
2008 WL 1766526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2008); Dudzienski v. Gordon Food Serv., Inc., 
No. 07 C 4033, 2008 WL 4372720, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2008); Follman, 532 F. Supp. 2d 
at 963; Harris v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 07 CV 2561, 2007 WL 3046162, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 10, 2007); Iosello, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 785. 
 157. See, e.g., Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc., No. 10-2191 (DWF/JJK), 2011 WL 1741912, at *1–2 
(D. Minn. May 4, 2011) (applying Iqbal and denying defendant’s motion to dismiss); see 
also Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc. (Fullwood II), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF), 2015 
WL 4486311, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015) (holding that, while partial compliance alone 
makes recklessness implausible, when combined with the reasonable inference that the 
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In Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc.,158 the plaintiff alleged more than the mere 
existence of publicity surrounding FACTA and the Clarification 
Act—an allegation applicable to any §	1681c(g) defendant.159 The 
plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had hired a third-party 
point-of-sale systems provider that had warned the defendant that 
upgrades to the point-of-sale system were necessary to comply with 
FACTA.160 Instead of making the necessary upgrades, the defendant 
allegedly “ignored the[] warnings,” then cancelled its contract with 
the point-of-sale provider.161 The court concluded that these 
allegations in particular were sufficient to allege a willful violation of 
FACTA.162 In this case, the court reasoned, the defendant not only 
clearly knew of its duty under FACTA, but also knew what actions it 
should take to bring its receipts into compliance with FACTA and 
still chose not to take those actions in order to save money.163 
Accordingly, Zaun provides an example of the kind of allegations that 
a plaintiff must be prepared to make in order to overcome the more 
demanding standards established by Twombly and Iqbal. Specifically, 
plaintiffs would have to plead facts analogous to the damning 
allegation that the Zaun defendant was warned that it was violating 
§	1681c(g), but chose to continue to violate FACTA to save money 
rather than comply with the law. And Zaun is not alone in rigorously 
applying Iqbal to §	1681c(g) claims. 
A. The Emerging Trend of Grants of 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss on 
the Basis of Failure to Adequately Plead a Willful Violation 
Since Iqbal, district courts have shown an increasing willingness 
to dismiss §	1681c(g) claims where only an expiration date has been 
included on the receipt.164 Excluding cases dealing with online 
receipts, merchant copies, and the inclusion of the credit card number 
on the receipt, as well as motions to dismiss third-party complaints 
and cases that otherwise do not address the plausibility of the 
allegations of willfulness or where Safeco applies, there are a total of 
eighteen written decisions granting or denying 12(b)(6) motions to 
 
defendant had specifically negotiated an exception in its liability insurance coverage for 
FACTA violations, the plaintiff had adequately alleged willfulness). 
 158. No. 10-2191 (DWF/JJK), 2011 WL 1741912 (D. Minn. May 4, 2011). 
 159. Id. at *2. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Compare Appendix B, with Appendix A. 
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dismiss.165 Of these eighteen decisions, eight grant the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, and two of the remaining ten grant the motion with 
prejudice. Further, as noted above, two of the ten cases denying 
motions to dismiss were decided shortly after Iqbal and fail to cite or 
apply Iqbal.166 Whether or not these two cases are counted, the post-
Iqbal §	1681c(g) cases demonstrate a stark departure from the pre-
Iqbal decisions, of which only two granted a motion to dismiss.167 
Additionally, the Southern District of New York recently dismissed a 
complaint with prejudice when the merchant failed to properly 
truncate the credit card number168—an unprecedented result 
suggesting that the trend of granting motions to dismiss continues to 
gather strength given that cases where too many credit card numbers 
are printed are rarely dismissed.169 Although the overall impact of 
Twombly and Iqbal may be debated, it is safe to say that for 
§	1681c(g) cases, Iqbal has been a game changer.170 
In June 2014, Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New 
York authored perhaps the most comprehensive decision dismissing a 
§	1681c(g) complaint,171 which was later followed by a published 
 
 165. My methodology in finding cases via Westlaw was to first use “1681c(g)” to pull 
the appropriate FACTA receipt requirement cases, then use either “12(b)(6)” or “motion 
to dismiss” to further winnow the results. At that point, I sorted the cases by date and read 
each case going back to the date of the Iqbal decision on May 18, 2009. I later returned to 
the results from the “1681c(g)” query without using the “12(b)(6)” or “motion to dismiss” 
filters to ensure that I had not missed any cases disposing of relevant motions to dismiss. 
See infra Appendix B for a table of relevant cases. One case, Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s 
Steakhouse, Inc., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, dismissing 
the plaintiff’s first amended complaint but granting the plaintiff leave to file a proposed 
second amended complaint, while also permitting the defendant to refile the motion to 
dismiss in response to the proposed complaint. (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF), 2014 
WL 6076733, at *1, *6–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014). This Comment will treat the Fullwood I 
case as though the motion to dismiss had been granted with leave to amend. 
 166. Supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 168. Katz v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 740(PAC), 2015 WL 405506, at *1–2 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015) (“[C]ontrary to Plaintiff’s argument, a pleading which 
demonstrates negligence does not ‘raise[ ] a triable issue as to recklessness.’ Plaintiff’s 
attempt at alleging recklessness—a higher standard, triggering statutory damages—cannot 
be achieved by merely alleging negligence—a lower standard, triggering actual damages. 
Such a conflation not only erodes the difference between negligence and recklessness, but 
it also renders the pleading standards imposed by Rule 12(b)(6) meaningless; in practice, it 
would essentially permit all plaintiffs alleging willful FACTA violations to bypass	Rule 
12(b)(6)	and proceed to discovery/summary judgment.” (citations omitted)). 
 169. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (discussing how cases involving 
violations of the credit card requirement are treated differently by courts). 
 170. Compare Appendix A, with Appendix B. 
 171. Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No. 13 Civ. 
7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-
3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014). Oral argument was heard on October 28, 2015, but at the time 
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decision denying the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.172 In 
Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette, America, Inc.,173 the plaintiff 
alleged that almost all other businesses complied with §	1681c(g), that 
various credit card companies had informed the defendant of 
FACTA’s requirements, that there was wide publicity of those 
requirements, and that credit card companies required removal of 
expiration dates.174 These allegations are essentially no different than 
those made by most plaintiffs in §	1681c(g) cases, with the exception 
of Zaun’s highly specific allegations.175 In his order dismissing the 
case, Judge Rakoff noted that the plaintiff implicitly argued that “a 
knowing violation can be inferred solely from the fact that a 
defendant knew of the relevant statute and then violated it.”176 But 
the plaintiff’s position—shared by the case law rejecting motions to 
dismiss—misunderstands Safeco and fails to place that decision in the 
broader context of civil willfulness jurisprudence, a task Judge Rakoff 
takes up in his decision. 
Judge Rakoff observed that, while Safeco deals primarily with 
the recklessness prong of willfulness under FACTA, it relies on 
earlier Supreme Court cases interpreting willfulness in the civil 
context.177 In one of those cases, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston,178 the Court stated that to make out a knowing violation, it 
is not enough to show that the defendant knew of a legal obligation; 
instead, the essence of a knowing violation is to know that one’s 
conduct violates that legal obligation.179 Accordingly, Judge Rakoff 
held that to survive a motion to dismiss, the “[c]omplaint must plead 
sufficient facts to support a plausible inference that defendant knew 
that its conduct was violating the statute, and not simply that the 
defendant knew about the existence of the statutory provision at 
issue.”180 Paris Baguette I therefore interprets Safeco as establishing 
 
of this Comment’s publication, no opinion had issued from the Second Circuit. Crupar-
Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc., No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct 28, 2015) (No. 56). 
 172. Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette II), 41 F. Supp. 3d 
411, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014). 
 173. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110. 
 174. Id. at *2–3. 
 175. Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc., No. 10-2191 (DWF/JJK), 2011 WL 1741912, at *2 (D. Minn. 
May 4, 2011). 
 176. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *3. 
 177. Id. at *3–4. 
 178. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
 179. Id. at 127–29. 
 180. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4. In doing so, Judge Rakoff expressly 
followed the approach of the District of Maine in Viodni v. Acadia Corp., 11-CV-00448-
NT, 2012 WL 1565128 (D. Me. Apr. 27, 2012) (granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss 
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that knowledge of FACTA does not alone make a knowing or 
reckless violation—whereas the alternative interpretation of Safeco 
forecloses the possibility of dismissal on a 12(b)(6) motion and 
essentially eliminates the requirement of a showing of willfulness 
because of the clarity of §	1681c(g).181 
Judge Rakoff continued by applying Iqbal, noting which 
allegations would be disregarded as conclusory before addressing 
whether the remaining allegations were sufficient to plausibly infer a 
reckless or knowing violation.182 First, he observed that the allegations 
of widespread publicity and other businesses’ compliance were 
applicable to all FACTA defendants and therefore established 
nothing with respect to Paris Baguette.183 Next, weighing the 
remaining allegations, the court concluded that the plaintiffs at most 
showed that Paris Baguette knew of FACTA and its requirements 
and acted negligently.184 Critically, from the fact that Paris Baguette 
had complied with the truncation requirement while failing to remove 
expiration dates, the court inferred that it was actually implausible to 
think that the defendant was more than negligent in its failure to 
remove the expiration date—the effort to remove the credit card 
numbers, the court reasoned, showed that there was some attempt to 
comply.185 This inference is crucial, as much of the earlier case law 
had refused to draw any such inference from the fact of partial 
compliance, instead focusing on the clarity of the statute and the 
corresponding lack of any defense under Safeco.186 
By rigorously applying Iqbal, Judge Rakoff arrived at the 
question that earlier cases denying motions to dismiss failed to 
address: how can general allegations of knowledge of the statute and 
 
and following Trans World Airlines in holding that mere knowledge of a statute is not 
sufficient for a knowing violation). 
 181. See Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4. Section 1681c(g) reads: “[N]o 
person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print 
more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt 
provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.” 15 U.S.C. §	1681c(g) 
(2012). Whatever ambiguity there may be in the statute’s plain text, the Clarification Act 
makes plain that printing the expiration date alone is sufficient to violate the statute. See 
Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act) of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-241, §	3(a), 122 Stat. 1565 (2008). 
 182. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4. 
 183. Id. (citing Komorowski v. All-Am. Indoor Sports, Inc., No. 13-2177-SAC, 2013 
WL 4766800, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Sept. 4, 2013); Miller-Huggins v. SpaClinic, LLC, No. 09 C 
2677, 2010 WL 963924, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2010)). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. E.g., Korman v. Walking Co., 503 F. Supp. 2d 755, 762 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“In short, 
the statutory text here is not, as was the case in Safeco, ‘less than pellucid.’ ”). 
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its requirements make a willful violation plausible when such 
knowledge is consistent with either a negligent or willful violation of 
§	1681c(g)? In this case, he concluded that the plaintiff had offered no 
further facts that would explain or even suggest why or how a 
defendant who had made some effort to comply with FACTA would 
knowingly or recklessly disregard the expiration date requirement as 
opposed to having merely been negligent in complying.187 The court 
reiterated this in its denial of the plaintiff’s motion for 
reconsideration: “[P]laintiff has pleaded no facts that make it 
plausible that defendant was anything other than ‘merely 
careless’	.	.	.	the allegations	.	.	.	show, at best, that defendant knew of 
the statute and acted carelessly in not complying with it.”188 
Paris Baguette I and II and the other post-Iqbal cases granting 
motions to dismiss depend on an interpretation of Safeco that is 
sharply at odds with that espoused by other courts. Because Safeco 
sets out the Supreme Court’s understanding of willfulness in the 
context of FACTA, the interpretation of that case can be 
determinative of whether or not willfulness has been adequately 
pleaded. Accordingly, Part IV examines how Safeco ought to be 
interpreted. 
IV.  INTERPRETING SAFECO 
For the purposes of §	1681c(g) litigation, Safeco presents two 
fundamental questions of interpretation for courts. First, should 
Safeco be interpreted as adding to preexisting jurisprudence on the 
meaning of willfulness in the civil context, or does it constitute the 
exclusive measure of willfulness in the context of FACTA? Second, 
does Safeco’s not-objectively-unreasonable-reading standard provide 
an affirmative defense, or can that standard be used to foreclose the 
grant of a motion to dismiss? If Safeco is interpreted as the exclusive 
measure of willfulness in the civil context such that it forecloses the 
grant of a motion to dismiss because of §	1681c(g)’s clarity, then every 
violation of §	1681c(g) becomes a willful violation. Such an 
interpretation effectively reads out of the statute the possibility of 
negligent violations of §	1681c(g). 
Courts have split on these two questions. Courts granting 
motions to dismiss—like the Southern District of New York in Paris 
Baguette I and II—tend to interpret Safeco with the aid of earlier 
 
 187. Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *4. 
 188. Paris Baguette II, 41 F. Supp. 3d 411, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 
14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014). 
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cases like Trans World Airlines and do not use Safeco to foreclose 
grants of motions to dismiss.189 Cases denying motions to dismiss take 
the opposite tack.190 
As with many of the issues arising in §	1681c(g) litigation, there 
are few appellate decisions interpreting Safeco in this context and 
none directly on point.191 The appellate case that most nearly 
addresses the proper interpretation of Safeco is Fuges v. Southwest 
Financial Services, Ltd.192 In Fuges, the defendant, a provider of 
property reports containing credit information such as liens, was sued 
for failure to prepare its property reports in compliance with the 
FCRA, as amended by FACTA.193 The defendant moved to dismiss, 
arguing that the FCRA did not apply to it, or, if it did, that there was 
no willful violation because its interpretation of the statute was not 
objectively unreasonable.194 The district court agreed and granted 
summary judgment, reasoning that whether or not the FCRA applied, 
under the Safeco standard no reasonable jury could find that the 
defendant had willfully violated the statute.195 On appeal, the plaintiff 
argued that, prior to the litigation, the defendant had never actually 
interpreted the statute at all, and so should not be entitled to the 
“Safeco reasonable interpretation defense.”196 The Third Circuit 
rejected this argument, affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.197 
 
 189. See, e.g., Paris Baguette I, 2014 WL 2990110, at *3–4 (interpreting Safeco with the 
aid of Trans World Airlines); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 
127–29 (1985) (holding that to establish a knowing violation requires showing that the 
defendant knew her conduct violated a known legal obligation).  
 190. See, e.g., Buechler v. Keyco, Inc., No. WDQ-09-2948, 2010 WL 1664226, at *2 
(“Buechler has sufficiently alleged willfulness. Unlike the provision of FCRA at issue in 
Safeco, the FACTA provision Keyco allegedly violated is unambiguous.”). 
 191. For example, Schlahtichman v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. is a straightforward application 
of Safeco to a case dealing with an email receipt. 615 F.3d 794, 798–804 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that 
internet receipts are not printed and so fall outside of §	1681c(g)). Similarly, Redman v. 
RadioShack Corp., in the portion of the decision devoted to the companion case Nicaj v. 
Shoe Carnival, affirming the district court’s grant of dismissal with prejudice, held that 
omitting only the year of the expiration date constituted “a permissible interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute.” 768 F.3d 622, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2014). And the Third Circuit, in 
Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., held that omitting the year, while based on an erroneous 
interpretation of FACTA, was not a willful violation because such omission was based on 
a not objectively unreasonable interpretation. 671 F.3d 371, 377–78 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(affirming a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss). 
 192. Fuges v. Sw. Fin. Servs., Ltd., 707 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 193. Id. at 245. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 243. 
 196. Id. at 249 (internal quotation marks removed). 
 197. Id. at 249–51, 255. 
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In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit repeatedly 
characterized Safeco as a “test” or “defense” rather than as an 
elaboration on what constitutes reckless behavior.198 It did so because 
Safeco made clear that, for purposes of the test established, intent and 
other subjective states of mind are irrelevant.199 In other words, 
Safeco creates a defense that requires an objective analysis under 
which the defendant’s subjective state of mind does not matter. A 
reasonable interpretation of the statute is not dispositive evidence of 
an actual, subjective lack of willfulness (i.e., recklessness or knowingly 
engaging in conduct violating the statute). Instead, a defendant who 
shows an objectively reasonable interpretation of the statute bypasses 
entirely the question of subjective willfulness and defeats the 
plaintiff’s claim of a willful violation by an affirmative defense. This is 
in keeping with the traditional understanding of an affirmative 
defense, which defeats the plaintiff’s claim even if she has made out a 
prima facie case by establishing the elements of the claim.200 
Accordingly, Safeco does not so much define “willfulness”—and so 
affect the struggle to establish that element of a claim for statutory 
damages—but rather provides an affirmative defense against a prima 
facie claim of a willful violation. This reading of Safeco interprets the 
decision within the Court’s broader jurisprudence on willfulness in 
the civil context while being highly congenial to §	1681c(g) defendants 
because even where no Safeco defense is available, the plaintiff must 
still adequately plead willfulness and eventually carry the burden of 
persuasion on that element—the very piece of the analysis that so 
many courts neglect in applying Safeco.201 
 
 198. Id. passim. 
 199. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 70 n.20 (2007) (“To the extent that 
[plaintiffs] argue that evidence of subjective bad faith can support a willfulness finding 
even when the company’s reading of the statute is objectively reasonable, their argument 
is unsound.”). 
 200. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE §	1270 (3d ed. 2004) (observing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
recognition of affirmative defenses is a “lineal descendant of the common law plea by way 
of ‘confession and avoidance,’ which permitted a defendant who was willing to admit that 
the plaintiff’s declaration demonstrated a prima facie case to then go on and allege 
additional new material that would defeat the plaintiff’s otherwise valid cause of action”). 
In federal courts today, “[a]n affirmative defense will defeat the plaintiff’s claim if it is 
accepted by the district court or the jury.” Id. Whereas in the absence of an affirmative 
defense a defendant must prevail by preventing the plaintiff from meeting her burden of 
persuasion as to the elements of the claim, by asserting an affirmative defense the 
defendant provides himself an avenue to victory by meeting his own burden of persuasion 
on the elements of the defense. 
 201. See supra Parts II–III.  
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A recent Southern District of New York case similarly concludes 
that the unavailability of a Safeco defense does not determine 
whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged a willful violation of 
FACTA. In Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc.,202 a §	1681c(g) 
case, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss but made 
clear that the plaintiff could file a proposed amended complaint to 
which the defendant would have the opportunity to offer a new 
motion to dismiss.203 The court explained that while the plaintiff’s first 
amended complaint—which had been the basis of the briefing for the 
motion to dismiss—fell short of adequately pleading willfulness, a 
new proposed complaint might not be so deficient and deserved 
briefing in its own right.204 
To reach this conclusion, the court engaged in an extended 
discussion of Safeco and what was necessary to adequately plead 
willfulness in a §	1681c(g) case.205 First, the court pithily summarized 
the interpretive difficulty presented by Safeco: “[I]t is unclear how to 
apply the Safeco Court’s standards for a knowing or reckless violation 
of the FCRA when the proper interpretation of the particular 
statutory provision is not in doubt.”206 The court then characterized 
this question of interpretation as presenting two possible answers—
either Safeco forecloses any inquiry into a defendant’s subjective 
willfulness because of the clarity of §	1681c(g), or a plaintiff must 
plead and eventually prove a subjectively knowing or reckless 
violation even in the absence of a not-objectively-unreasonable 
reading of the statute. Continuing, the court observed, “If there is 
only one reasonable reading of the statute, does a willful violation 
flow automatically once knowledge of the statute’s requirements is 
demonstrated? Or must there be awareness that the defendant’s 
behavior violates or recklessly runs the risk of violating those 
requirements?”207 
 
 202. Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc. (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF), 
2014 WL 6076733 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014). 
 203. Fullwood I, 2014 WL 6076733, at *1 (“Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied 
without prejudice to refile in light of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to her 
complaint	.	.	.	.”). Despite the court’s characterization, this result is the functional 
equivalent of a grant without prejudice of defendant’s motion to dismiss, insofar as the 
plaintiff will file an amended complaint to which the defendant will have the opportunity 
to respond with a second 12(b)(6) motion. 
 204. Id. at *7–8. 
 205. See id. at *4. 
 206. Id. at *4. 
 207. Id. 
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The court then established that both district and appellate courts 
have interpreted Safeco in light of other federal civil statutes.208 At 
least two district courts, including the Southern District of New York 
in Paris Baguette I and II, had taken the approach of requiring 
subjective recklessness, interpreting Safeco in the context of earlier 
cases like Trans World Airlines.209 Further, appellate courts have used 
Safeco to interpret the meaning of willfulness in other federal 
statutes.210 Finding this approach persuasive, the court in Fullwood 
concluded that knowledge alone is not enough to make out a willful 
violation; instead, knowledge of FACTA and its requirements must 
be coupled with “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violat[ing] 
those requirements.”211 
Though lacking an authoritative Supreme Court or appellate 
decision on point, this interpretation of Safeco as providing an 
additional defense to be used alongside, rather than in place of, 
subjective willfulness has much to recommend it. First, abundant 
persuasive authority supports this interpretation.212 As the Fuges 
court points out,213 the Supreme Court’s own dicta in Safeco implies 
that, where there is no objectively reasonable reading of the statute 
supporting the defendant’s conduct, subjective intent still matters 
because the plaintiff must still carry the burden of persuasion on the 
willfulness element to recover statutory damages.214 Safeco then 
stands only for the proposition that where there is an objectively 
reasonable reading, the defendant’s subjective state of mind is 
irrelevant.215 Further, the Safeco Court itself emphasized that it was 
 
 208. See id. at *4–5. 
 209. Id. (citing Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette, Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No. 
13 Civ. 7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014), appeal docketed, 
No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014); Vidoni v. Acadia Corp., No. 11-cv-00448-NT, 2012 WL 
1565128, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 27, 2012)). 
 210. Id. at *5 (citing Fryer v. A.S.A.P. Fire & Safety Corp., 658 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 
2011) (using Safeco to interpret willfulness under the Age Employment Discrimination 
Act); Armalite, Inc., v. Lambert, 544 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2008) (using Safeco to 
interpret willfulness under the Gun Control Act of 1968). 
 211. Id. at *6. 
 212. See, e.g., Fuges v. Sw. Fin. Servs., Ltd., 707 F.3d 241, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(characterizing Safeco as establishing a defense); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 
47, 69, 70 n.20 (2007) (finding no need to inquire into defendant’s state of mind given the 
not objectively unreasonable reading of the statute). 
 213. Fuges, 707 F.3d at 248–49. 
 214. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 70 n.20 (“Respondent-plaintiffs argue that evidence of 
subjective bad faith must be taken into account in determining whether a company acted 
knowingly or recklessly for purposes of §	1681n(a). To the extent that they argue that 
evidence of subjective bad faith can support a willfulness finding even when the company’s 
reading of the statute is objectively reasonable, their argument is unsound.”). 
 215. Id. 
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not “deviat[ing] from the common law understanding.”216 Though no 
appellate court has ruled directly on point, Fuges217 and the appellate 
decisions cited in Fullwood I218 show that appellate courts have 
generally interpreted Safeco in this vein as well. Persuasive district 
court opinions granting motions to dismiss in §	1681c(g) cases, such as 
Paris Baguette I and II,219 further buttress the soundness of this 
interpretation. 
Sound interpretive and policy reasons also counsel this approach 
to Safeco. Unless otherwise indicated, common law terms should be 
construed according to their common law understanding, and 
Congress crafts legislation expecting the courts to do just that.220 
Further, this interpretation avoids creating a balkanized Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on civil willfulness, where different standards 
apply depending on the statutory context. The alternative—
interpreting Safeco as the exclusive measure of willfulness in the 
context of FACTA—would also read out of the statute claims for 
negligent violations of §	1681c(g) because that provision’s clarity 
precludes any alternative, objectively reasonable reading. 
Additionally, lawsuits based on the expiration date alone offer no 
consumer benefit,221 and, still more unfavorably, litigation costs will 
be passed on to consumers even in the absence of awards or 
settlements.222 By interpreting Safeco in line with other decisions on 
willfulness rather than as foreclosing motions to dismiss for failure to 
adequately plead willfulness, these costs can be somewhat mitigated 
by the greater frequency of grants of motions to dismiss and the lower 
value of settlements obtained without the threat of discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the high costs and scant benefits of §	1681c(g) lawsuits 
based only on the printing of expiration dates, this Comment has 
 
 216. Id. at 69 (“Here, there is no need to pinpoint the negligence/recklessness line, for 
Safeco’s reading of the statute, albeit erroneous, was not objectively unreasonable.”). 
 217. Fuges, 707 F.3d at 249. 
 218. Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc. (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ. 7174(KPF), 
2014 WL 6076733, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014). 
 219. Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette, Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette I), No. 13 Civ. 
7013(JSR), 2014 WL 2990110, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-
3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2014); Crupar-Weinmann v. Paris Baguette Am., Inc. (Paris Baguette 
II), 41 F. Supp. 3d 411, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-3709 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 
2014). 
 220. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 48 (citing Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500–01 (2000); Comm’r 
v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993)). 
 221. Supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 222. Supra notes 20–28 and accompanying text. 
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argued that courts ought to take two related measures to curtail the 
social costs of §	1681c(g) litigation in light of the lack of consumer 
protection benefit delivered by the expiration date requirement. First, 
district courts should not hesitate to engage in the “common sense” 
inquiry required by Twombly and Iqbal—an inquiry motivated by the 
costs of discovery and the dangers of in terrorem strike suits.223 
Second, given that courts cannot decide a motion to dismiss 
challenging the adequacy of allegations of willfulness without 
reference to Safeco, courts ought to interpret Safeco in the context of 
the Supreme Court’s broader civil willfulness jurisprudence and the 
term’s common law meaning. By so doing, courts can rein in abusive 
§	1681c(g) litigation. 
While there are good legal and policy reasons for courts to take 
these steps, they may not be sufficient. The courts cannot write 
§	1681c(g) out of FACTA and the FRCA. Additionally, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are likely to adapt to heightened pleading standards and 
will find creative ways to adequately plead willfulness.224 Instead, a 
legislative solution is necessary. The two simplest and clearest 
solutions would be either to: (1) remove entirely the expiration date 
requirement from §	1681c(g); or (2) modify the provision for statutory 
damages such that none are available where only an expiration date 
has been printed, maintaining the possibility of statutory damages for 
willful violations of the truncation requirement. Other possibilities 
include prohibiting statutory damages for class action suits or placing 
a ceiling on aggregate statutory damages to limit potential liability.225 
Given the lack of any appreciable consumer benefit from 
§	1681c(g) litigation based on the printing of an expiration date, 
proposals to merely cap aggregate statutory damages do not go far 
enough. Such proposals would merely reduce the costs to be passed 
on to consumers. But the lack of benefits to be gained by these suits 
makes any such cost a net loss to consumer welfare. Of the other 
proposals, removing the possibility of statutory damages might be 
preferable to removing the expiration date provision altogether. This 
would leave open the possibility of recovery were some plaintiff to 
 
 223. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007). 
 224. See, e.g., Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse (Fullwood I), No. 13 Civ. 
7174(KPF), 2014 WL 6076733, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014) (discussing how much 
knowledge is needed to permit a plausible inference of a willful violation and how 
plaintiff’s proposed complaint may meet that standard). 
 225. See Paul Karlsgodt, Statutory Penalties and Class Actions: Social Justice or 
Legalized Extortion?, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 47 (2013). 
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suffer actual damages through the printing of his card’s expiration 
date. 
At the same time, in the absence of decisive judicial or legislative 
remedies, point-of-sale systems providers and companies with retail 
operations ought to ensure that the receipts they print are, and 
remain, FACTA compliant. The testing of new point-of-sale systems 
and upgrades to older systems should receive special attention. 
Although the major players in the point-of-sale industry understand 
what FACTA requires and their products comply with FACTA by 
default,226 companies that develop their own point-of-sale systems or 
depend on less established point-of-sale providers must be especially 
vigilant. Despite FACTA-compliant defaults, modern point-of-sale 
systems are highly configurable by persons without technical 
training,227 and the possibility remains that personnel unaware of 
FACTA’s requirements could inadvertently alter the configuration of 
a point-of-sale system to print noncompliant receipts.228 Merchants 
should put in place safeguards to prevent such personnel from 
altering at least those configuration options that are pertinent for 
FACTA compliance. The potential costs of noncompliance are too 
great to ignore. 
 
 226. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey J. Hawkins, supra note 52. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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APPENDIX A.  PRE-IQBAL §	1681C(G) DECISIONS ON 12(B)(6) 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ARGUING FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD 
WILLFULNESS AND EXCLUDING ONLINE PURCHASES 
Date Case Name Disposition Citation 
3/12/07 
Clark v. Marshalls 
of MA, Inc. 
Denied 
2007 WL 1100412  
(C.D. Cal.) 
4/03/07 
Blanco v. El Pollo 
Loco, Inc. 
Denied† 
2007 WL 1113997  
(C.D. Cal.) 
4/03/07 
Aeschbacher v. Cal. 
Pizza Kitchen, Inc. 
Denied 
2007 WL 1500853  
(C.D. Cal.) 
4/05/07 
Pirian v. In-N-Out 
Burgers 
Denied† 
2007 WL 1040864  
(C.D. Cal.) 
5/04/07 
Arcilla v. Adidas 
Promotional Retail 
Operations, Inc. 
Denied 
488 F. Supp. 2d 965 
(C.D. Cal.) 
5/22/07 
Soualian v. Int’l 
Coffee and Tea 
LLC 
Denied† 
2007 WL 4877903  
(C.D. Cal.) 
6/09/07 
Lopez v. 
Gymboree Corp. 
Denied 
2007 WL 1690886  
(N.D. Cal.) 
7/20/07 
Ehrheart v. 
Lifetime Brands, 
Inc. 
Denied† 
498 F. Supp. 2d 753 
(E.D. Pa.) 
8/22/07 
Iosello v. Leiblys, 
Inc. 
Denied 
502 F. Supp. 2d 782 
(N.D. Ill.) 
8/28/07 
Korman v. Walking 
Co. 
Denied† 
503 F. Supp. 2d 755 
(E.D. Pa.) 
10/17/07 
Follman v. 
Hospitality Plus of 
Carpentersville, Inc. 
Denied 
532 F. Supp. 2d 960 
(N.D. Ill.) 
12/3/07 
Ramirez v. MGM 
Mirage, Inc. 
Denied† 
524 F. Supp. 2d 1226 
(D. Nev.) 
 
† It is unclear from the decision whether the expiration date, the credit card number, 
or both were printed. Although their precedential value is dubious, the author includes 
these cases to be comprehensive. 
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Date Case Name Disposition Citation 
12/11/07 
Ehrheart v. 
Verizon Wireless 
Denied 
547 F. Supp. 2d 463 
(W.D. Pa.) 
12/18/07 
Follman v. Village 
Squire, Inc. 
Denied 
542 F. Supp. 2d 816 
(N.D. Ill.) 
2/25/08 
Gamaly v. Tumi, 
Inc. 
Denied 
2008 WL 512718  
(N.D. Cal.) 
3/04/08 
Miller v. Sunoco, 
Inc. 
Denied 
2008 WL 623806  
(E.D. Pa.) 
3/19/08 
Dudzienski v. 
Gordon Food 
Serv., Inc. 
Denied 
2008 WL 4372720  
(N.D. Ill.) 
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APPENDIX B.  POST-IQBAL §	1681C(G) DECISIONS ON 12(B)(6) 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS ARGUING FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD 
WILLFULNESS WHERE ONLY THE EXPIRATION DATE WAS PRINTED 
ON THE RECEIPT AND EXCLUDING ONLINE PURCHASES229 
Date Case Name Disposition Citation 
4/05/08 Howard v. Hooters Granted 
2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30776  
(S.D. Tex.) 
4/14/08 Troy v. Home Run 
Inn, Inc. 
Denied 2008 WL 1766526 (N.D. Ill.) 
5/09/08 
In re The TJX Cos., 
Inc., Fair and 
Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act  
Denied 2008 WL 2020375 (D. Kan.) 
1/29/09 Kubas v. Standard 
Parking Corp. Ill. 
Denied 594 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Ill.) 
3/19/09 
Rosenthal v. 
Longchamp Coral 
Gables LLC 
Granted 
without 
prejudice 
603 F. Supp. 2d 1359 
(S.D. Fla.) 
4/22/10 Buechler v. Keyco, 
Inc. 
Denied 2010 WL 1664226 (D. Md.) 
5/4/11 Zaun v. Tuttle, Inc. Denied 
2011 WL 1741912 
(D. Minn.) 
10/12/11 Sanders v. W&W 
Wholesale, Inc. 
Denied 2011 WL 4840978 (N.D. Ill.) 
10/18/11 Seo v. CC CJV Am. 
Holdings, Inc. 
Granted 2011 WL 4946507 (C.D. Cal.) 
4/27/12 Vidoni v. Acadia 
Corp. 
Granted 2012 WL 1565128 (D. Me.) 
3/19/13 Dover v. Shoe 
Show, Inc. 
Denied 2013 WL 1748337 (W.D. Pa.) 
5/13/13 Rouse v. Hennepin 
Cty. 
Denied 2013 WL 1969790 (D. Minn.) 
9/4/13 
Komorowski v. 
All-American 
Indoor Sports, Inc. 
Granted 
without 
prejudice 
2013 WL 4766800 
(D. Kan.) 
 
 229. Practitioners should also be aware of the recent case in the Southern District of 
New York granting with prejudice a 12(b)(6) motion where the defendant failed to 
properly truncate the credit card number. Katz v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 
740(PAC), 2015 WL 405506 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015). This case is unprecedented in its 
dismissal, although it remains to be seen whether this case represents an outlier or the 
beginning of a new trend among federal district courts. 
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Date Case Name Disposition Citation 
6/23/14 Lavery v. 
RadioShack Corp. 
Denied 2014 WL 2819037 (N.D. Ill.) 
6/30/14 
Crupar-Weinmann 
v. Paris Baguette 
Am., Inc. 
Granted with 
prejudice 
2014 WL 2990110 
(S.D.N.Y.) 
11/14/14 
Fullwood v. 
Wolfgang’s 
Steakhouse, Inc. 
(Fullwood I) 
Denied with 
leave to refile 
2014 WL 6076733 
(S.D.N.Y.) 
12/29/14 
Reed v. Swatch 
Grp. (US), Inc. 
(Reed I) 
Granted 
without 
prejudice 
2014 WL 7370031 
(D.N.J.) 
7/23/15 
Fullwood v. 
Wolfgang’s 
Steakhouse, Inc. 
(Fullwood II) 
Denied 2015 WL 4486311 (S.D.N.Y.) 
10/01/15 
Reed v. Swatch 
Grp. (US), Inc. 
(Reed II) 
Denied 2015 WL 5822669 (D.N.J.) 
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